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TREASURY SHARES AND PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS:
SCHWARTZ V. MARIEN
INTRODUCTION

The New York Court of Appeals has recently expanded the scope
of protection available to shareholders of a close corporation. Traditionally, a shareholder had no legally recognized right to maintain
proportionate stock ownership in the face of a sale of treasury stock
for a valid corporate purpose. In such cases, strict application of the
treasury share doctrine would have compelled a finding that the shareholder had not been injured by the resulting reduction in his proportionate ownership of the corporation. The court has now found that a
shareholder sustains injury even if the sale of treasury stock furthers a
valid corporate objective when there is another means of accomplishing the objective that would not disturb proportionate ownership. This
note will compare the protection now offered by the court of appeals
with the formal concepts of the treasury share doctrine.
I. FACTS

Plaintiff Margaret A. Schwartz owned fifty shares of the outstanding stock of the Superior Engraving Company, a closely held corporation. The fifty remaining shares of outstanding stock were held by the
four members of the Marien family: Robert, Edward, August, and
Clara. Another fifty shares of stock, reacquired by the corporation
from a former shareholder, were held*by the corporation as treasury

stock.1
At a special meeting of the board of directors on May 6, 1968,
Edward Marien was elected a director to fill the vacancy created by
the death of Girard Dietrich, plaintiff's father.2 Plaintiff abstained
1. Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d 334, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1975).
Three hundred shares of stock had been issued in 1934 to the six original shareholders.
Three of these original shareholders had sold their shares back to the corporation and

these 150 shares were cancelled by the corporation. A.O. Smith received 50 shares from
one of the original shareholders; upon Smith's death, the corporation purchased his 50
shares. These shares are the treasury shares in question. Brief for Respondents at 6-7.
2. This election was held pursuant to N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 705 (a) (McKinney
Supp. 1975), which provides that vacancies on the board of directors (except those
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from voting and Edward was elected by the two affirmative votes of
the Marien brothers. 3 The second action taken at that meeting was
the approval of a resolution directing that the president of the corporation, Robert Marien, negotiate with plaintiff for the corporation's
purchase of her stock. Robert Marien then proposed a resolution to
accept offers by five persons to purchase one share of treasury stock
each for $1200 per share. The five prospective purchasers included
two employees of the company and, significantly, the three Marien
brothers. This resolution passed over plaintiff's abstention.4
The effect of the sale of treasury stock was to reduce the proportion of outstanding stock held by plaintiff from 50 percent to approximately 48 percent. Once plaintiff's proportionate shareholding fell
below 50 percent she lost the ability to regain control of two directorships at the next election. Plaintiff's loss of the opportunity to control
one-half of the board and her relegation to a minority position were
especially crucial, as they affected her bargaining position with respect
to the contemplated sale of her holdings to the corporation.0 In addition, the sale of the treasury stock gave control of the corporation to
the Marien family even if the two employee-recipients did not vote
with them. 6
Following the meeting, plaintiff protested the sale of treasury
stock and offered to purchase, at the same price, five shares of the remaining treasury stock. This offer was rejected by the other directors
for the stated reason that it was not in the best interests of the
created by the removal of a director without cause) shall be filled by a vote of the
board. At the time of the election, the board of directors consisted of Margaret Schwartz,
Robert Marien, and August Marien. Although Margaret Schwartz owned 50 percent of
the outstanding stock and normally would have been able to appoint two out of four
directors, the filling of this type of vacancy differs from the normal election of a director.
3. With one vote, Margaret Schwartz could not have influenced the outcome.
4. Again, her vote would not have been controlling, since her ownership of 50
percent of the outstanding stock was not reflected in the composition of the board of
directors.
5. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104 (McKinney 1963) provides that holders of onehalf of the outstanding stock of a corporation may petition for dissolution in the case
of deadlock or internal dissension. This statutory provision provides a strong inducement for the remaining shareholders to offer a fair price to an owner of one-half of
the outstanding stock when he seeks to sell his holdings. One of the characteristics of
a close corporation is that often there is no outside market for the shares; thus, sale
to other shareholders or to the corporation is the only viable method of disposal. 1 F.H.
O'NEa., CLOSE CORPORaTIONS § 1.07 (2d ed. 1971).
6. This assumes that the Marien family would vote as a block, a conclusion
that was implicit in the court opinions discussed later in the text, and one that
is realistic in a close corporation context.
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corporation because plaintiff was then negotiating for the sale of her
present holdings. Implicit in this contention by the other directors was
the recognition that if she regained ownership of 50 percent of the
outstanding stock, plaintiff would be able to obtain a better purchase
price for her holdings at additional cost to the corporation. At a subsequent shareholders' meeting, held on July 25, 1968, plaintiff was
removed from the board of directors.
Plaintiff instituted an action against Superior Engraving and the
five treasury stock recipients, requesting a judgment voiding the July 25
shareholders' meeting and compelling the sale to her of five shares of
the remaining treasury stock.7 Plaintiff did not allege a statutory preemptive right to the stock but asked that the court award her the right
to purchase such stock as an equitable remedy.8 She alleged that the
directors were guilty of conspiracy and fraud in the sale of treasury
stock and the subsequent refusal to accept her offer of purchase. At
special term, the motions of both parties for summary judgment were
denied, and plaintiff appealed from this denial. The Appellate Division
for the Fourth Department, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the
denial of summary judgment but noted that plaintiff would be entitled
to relief if it were shown that the sale of treasury stock was solely for
the purpose of reducing plaintiff's proportionate ownership. 9 In a
unanimous opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the order of the
fourth department and went on to state that plaintiff would be entitled
to relief if it were shown that the sale of treasury stock was solely for
the purpose of reducing plaintiff's proportionate interest or if the
alleged valid corporate objective could be accomplished by means
which would not have disturbed plaintiff's proportionate stock ownership.10 Because of the modifications they signal in judicial protection
of the shareholder's proportionate ownership in a closely-held corporation, the opinions of both the fourth department and the court of
appeals warrant detailed examination.
7. Plaintiff had originally requested a preliminary injunction to bar the July 25
shareholders' meeting and asked that the defendant-purchasers be ordered to return to
the corporation the five shares they had purchased. Her request for an injunction was
denied, and the complaint was dismissed as to defendants Kasprzak and Zimmerman,
the employee-recipients. Schwartz v. Marien, 43 App. Div. 2d 307, 310-11, 351 N.Y.S.2d
216, 220 (4th Dep't 1974).
8. Schwartz v. Marien, 43 App. Div. 2d 307, 310-11, 351 N.Y.S.2d 216, 220-21
(4th Dep't 1974) (dissenting opinion).
9. 43 App. Div. 2d 307, 351 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1974).
10. 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d 334, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1975).
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II. THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT OPINION

The fourth department affirmed the denial of plaintiff-appellant's
motion for summary judgment in a per curiam opinion, with Judge
Moule dissenting.'1 The court recognized that according to New York
law, in the absence of a specific provision in the certificate of incorporation, there is no statutory pre-emptive right for a sale of treasury
stock. 12 Even though plaintiff could not assert this statutory right, she
was protected, in the court's opinion, by the principle that "directors
of the corporation owe a fiduciary duty both to the corporation and
to its shareholders."' 3 Thus, the sale of treasury stock was not insulated from allegations that it was sold in breach of fiduciary duty
merely by being exempt from a statutory pre-emptive right. According
to the court, the sale of stock, if not consistent "with the established
legal standards of honesty and fair dealing in the management of the
corporation," would be such a breach of fiduciary duty.' 4 More precisely, "[i]f the purpose of the Board of Directors was to diminish
plaintiff's proportionate ownership without benefiting the corporation,
then appellant is entitled to relief."' 5 The court did not, however,
state the exact form of relief to which plaintiff might be entitled.
Hammer v. Werner,16 the only case cited by the court in its brief
per curiam opinion, provides no clear indication of the remedy contemplated. The Hammer court held that "special circumstances or
acts constituting the breach of duty may generate a pre-emptive right
which would not otherwise exist, although the wrong may be redressed
as a breach of duty independent of the existence of a pre-emptive
11. Schwartz v. Marien, 43 App. Div. 2d 307, 351 N.Y.S.2d 216 (4th Dep't 1974).
12. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP.LAW § 622(e) (4) (McKinney 1963).
13. 43 App. Div. 2d at 307, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 217-18.
14. Id. at 307-08, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 218. This possible breach of fiduciary
duty reflects the well-known principle that directors are bound to act at all times
in furtherance of the interests of the corporation and not for personal advantage. See
Billings v. Shaw, 209 N.Y. 265, 103 N.E. 142 (1913); Jacobson v. Brooklyn Lumber
Co., 184 N.Y. 152, 76 N.E. 1075 (1906); Hammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265
N.Y.S. 172 (2d Dep't 1933); H. HENN, LAW or CORPORATIONS § 173 (2d ed. 1970).

An analogous principle is that directors may not authorize the issuance to themselves
of originally authorized but unissued stock for the primary purpose of transforming themselves from minority to majority shareholders. See Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach.
Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d 1268 (Ct. App. 1936); Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage
& Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 278-80, 170 N.E. 917, 919-20 (1930). In such a situation, and in a situation presented by the sale of treasury stock for a similar purpose,
the directors are not acting in furtherance of the interests of the corporation.
15. 43 App. Div. 2d at 308, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
16. 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N.Y.S. 172 (2d Dep't 1933).
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right."' 7 Two alternative methods for determining relief are suggested
by the court's citation to Hammer.
It is not apparent from the instant case whether the fourth department would permit plaintiff to recover as if a "pre-emptive right"
to the treasury stock had been created, in which case she might be
allowed to purchase five shares in the corporation. Another possibility
is that, although a "pre-emptive right" had been generated, plaintiff
would be allowed to purchase only three shares-the amount that
would enable her to maintain an equality of voting power with the
defendant directors. Recourse to this alternative would require a finding that plaintiff had not been injured by the issuance of stock to the
two employees. The labeling of the denial of the opportunity to
purchase treasury shares as a "generation of pre-emptive rights" will
be discussed below.
The court recognized that both parties were concerned with the
bargaining position of the plaintiff. A breach of fiduciary duty would
be established if it were shown that the sole purpose of defendant's
conduct was to diminish plaintiff's proportionate interest without benefiting the corporation. Thus, if the defendant directors were motivated
both by a desire to diminish the plaintiff's proportionate ownership
and by a desire to benefit the corporation, plaintiff apparently would
not be entitled to relief.'8 Defendants alleged that the sale of treasury
shares was justified as an attempt to insure the continued employment
of key employees and that their refusal to sell to plaintiff was in the best
interests of the corporation (plaintiff was then negotiating for the sale
of her holdings). Because a trial was necessary to evaluate the conduct
of defendants, summary judgment was denied.
III. THE COURT OF ArPEALS DECISION

The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment of the
fourth department.' 9 In an opinion by Judge Jones, the court held
17. Id. at 42, 265 N.Y.S. at 177 (emphasis added).
18. For a criticism of the appellate division opinion as a failure to protect the
reasonable expectations of shareholders of a close corporation by the invocation of the
business purpose doctrine, see Weiss, Business Associations, 1974 Survey of New York
Law, 26 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 197, 222-26 (1975).
19. Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d 334, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1975).
The case was remanded for trial and subsequently settled out of court. Defendants
agreed to pay plaintiff $1200 per share for her fifty shares of stock, thus resolving the
problem of bargaining position. The granting of summary judgment would not have
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that material questions of fact existed. However, the more detailed
opinion of the court of appeals stated the relative legal positions of
the parties in a manner significantly different from that of the appellate
division.
The court of appeals accepted the first conclusion of the appellate
division that, although plaintiff did not have a statutory pre-emptive
right to the treasury stock in question, she was protected by the fiduciary responsibility owed by directors to shareholders.2 0 Also in accord with the reasoning of the appellate division, the court stated that
a "[d]eparture from precisely uniform treatment of stockholders may
be justified . . . where a bona fide business purpose indicates that the
best interests of the corporation would be served ... ."21 This much

of the opinion merely reaffirmed the principle that the directors must
act in furtherance of the corporate interest.
The appellate division had been silent on the issue of the burden
of proof, but the court of appeals stated that the burden should be
shifted to the defendant directors because "a prima facie case of unequal stockholder treatment is made out," and because "it appears
that members of the board of directors favored themselves individually
over the complaining shareholder. ' 22 This shifting of the burden of
proof recognizes the self-dealing nature of the sale.2 3 Instead of merely
showing that their actions were in furtherance of a valid corporate
objective (as required by the appellate division), the defendants were
required to show that "such objective could not have been accomplished substantially as effectively by other means which would not
have disturbed proportionate stock ownership.12 4 This additional requirement was said to be justified because "disturbance of equality
of stock ownership in a corporation closely held for several years by
been as effective in the resolution of the controversy, since the parties still would have
faced negotiations for the purchase of plaintiff's holdings. Perhaps judicial encouragement of this type of settlement was the underlying reason for denial of summary judgment.
20. Both the court of appeals and the appellate division treated the action as one
for breach of fiduciary duty although plaintiff had pleaded conspiracy and fraud.
21. 37 N.Y.2d at 492, 335 N.E.2d at 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
22. Id.
23. Although there is usually a presumption that directors of a corporation have
acted properly, this presumption has been held not to apply when the directors are
dealing with themselves as individuals. See Ross Transport, Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md.
573, 583, 45 A.2d 267, 271-72 (1946); Sage v. Culver, 147 N.Y. 241, 247, 41 N.E.
513, 514 (1895); Wohl v. Miller, 5 App. Div. 2d 126, 133, 169 N.Y.S.2d 233, 241
(1st Dep't 1957).
24. 37 N.Y.2d at 492, 335 N.E.2d at 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
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the members of two families calls for special justification in the cor-25
porate interest ....
By holding that plaintiff was entitled to maintain her proportionate interest in outstanding stock unless the change in proportionate
ownership was required to achieve a valid corporate objective not
otherwise attainable, the court has radically departed from prior doctrine in the field of treasury shares and pre-emptive rights.

IV.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADITIONAL TREASURY STOCK

DOCTRINE AND THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

Treasury shares are shares which have been issued to shareholders
and thereafter reacquired by the corporation through donation, forfeiture, purchase, redemption, conversion, or otherwise 2 6 They are
not voted, nor do they participate in dividends or distribution of net
assets upon dissolution. 27 If one conceives of a share of stock as a contract between the shareholder and the corporation, problems arise in
the determination of the exact status of treasury shares. Ballantine
has characterized treasury shares as a "masterpiece of legal magic": 28
When so-called treasury shares are sold by the corporation it is
(by a fiction) regarded as if the shares issued to the purchaser were
the old shares and as if the corporation had merely been an intermediate transferee. In reality the old contract was extinguished by
merger and the new shares are new units of interest created in their
29
place.
Whether or not treasury shares are legal magic, they possess legal
characteristics different from an original issue of shares. Most important to this discussion is the doctrine that treasury shares ordinarily
are not subject to pre-emptive rights.30
25. Id.
26. H.

HENN,

supra note 14, at § 158. One author has pointed out that a fre-

quent mistake has been to apply the term "treasury shares" to those shares which have
been authorized but remain unissued. Garrett, Treasury Shares Under the Model Business Corporation Act, 15 Bus. LAW. 916, 917 (1960).
27. H. HENN, supranote 14, at § 158.
28. Ballantine, The Curious Fiction of Treasury Shares, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 536, 537

(1946).
29. Id. at 538 (footnotes omitted).
30. Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); Crosby v.
Stratton, 17 Colo. App. 212, 68 P. 130 (1902). For criticism of this exception, see 32
Micn. L. Rav. 110 (1933); 36 YALE L.J. 1181 (1927).
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The pre-emptive right is the right possessed by a shareholder "to
pre-empt (or to purchase before others) a new issue of shares in proportion to his present interests in the corporation." 3' 1 This right was
said to exist in equity to protect a shareholder's proportionate voting
power and his proportionate interest in the corporate earnings and
assets. 32 The rationale for the exclusion of treasury stock from the
pre-emptive rights doctrine is that a shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation is determined when stock is issued.38 However, because the proportional interest of any stockholder is determined by reference to the number of outstanding shares, a sale-back
of stock by one shareholder will increase the proportion of outstanding stock in the hands of each remaining shareholder by decreasing
the total number of outstanding shares. When outstanding stock is
purchased by a corporation, held as treasury stock, and finally resold to
another shareholder, the resale of the stock merely restores the remaining shareholders to the proportional status they held prior to the
corporate purchase. The fact that a shareholder now holds that proportion in relation to a different shareholder-that is, the purchaser
of the treasury stock-is irrelevant. It must be noted that the shareholder may have had the opportunity to exercise his pre-emptive right
in relation to this particular stock when it was first issued.34
The treasury stock exception to the pre-emptive rights doctrine
is grounded in the propostion that a shareholder suffers no injury
merely by reinstatement to his former proportionate stock ownership
position. For example, if a shareholder owned 33 percent of the outstanding stock of a corporation, a purchase by the corporation of another shareholder's 33 percent interest would not entitle the first shareholder to maintain his resulting 50 percent interest in the future. This
31. H. HNN, supra note 14, at § 174. Two old but frequently cited articles on
pre-emptive rights are Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to
New Shares, 43 HAnv. L. Rlv. 586 (1930); Frey, Shareholder's Pre-emptive Rights,
38 YALE L.J. 563 (1929). The doctrine is acknowledged to have originated in the

case of Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364 (1807). The earliest New York case seems
to be Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906).
32. Comment, Corporation Law: Exceptions to Stockholder's Preemptive Right, 35

U. COLO. L. REv. 482, 483 (1963). Another protected interest is the opportunity to

invest capital in a demonstrably profitable enterprise. Berle, Corporate Devices for Diluting Stock Participations, 31 COLUm. L. Rev. 1239, 1257 (1931).
33. See Note, The Legal Status of Treasury Shares, 85 U. PA. L. Rvv. 622 (1937).
See also 32 Mcr. L.R Ev. 110 (1933); 36 YALE L.J. 1181 (1927).
34. Of course, this is inapplicable if the stock had been issued as part of the
original incorporation.
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increase in proportional interest is always subject to subsequent reduction back to 33 percent when the corporation resells the treasury stock.
The doctrine has been incorporated into the New York pre-emptive
rights statute by the exception made therein for treasury shares.35
Of course, as the instant case recognizes, a sale of treasury stock
is not insulated from an allegation that it was sold in breach of fiduciary duty.36 For example, sale of treasury stock at an inadequate price
will dilute the interests of the other shareholders.3 7 This dilution differs from that resulting from a new issue of stock because the shareholder's proportionate interest is reduced by an amount that is not
offset by a fair increase in capital to the corporation. Another possible
breach of fiduciary duty in a sale of treasury stock is the appropriation of excessive salaries by the directors, followed by a secret purchase
of the stock with the funds thus acquired. 38 4nd, a sale of treasury
stock might be in furtherance of no valid corporate objective, but
solely for the purpose of shifting control to a certain faction. 39
In such instances, if the other shareholders had been given the
opportunity ratably to purchase the treasury stock that was sold, they
would have been able to protect their interests. Even in the case of
sale at an inadequate price, the proportionate purchase by the other
shareholders at the same price would at least protect their interests from
dilution.40 The protection afforded shareholders by a proportionate
purchase of treasury shares in such circumstances seems to underlie the
discussion in Hammer regarding the generation of a pre-emptive
right.41 The classification of such a purchase as the exercise of a preemptive right, however, does not fall within the usual understanding
35. See N.Y. Bus.

CORP. LAW

§ 622e(4) (McKinney 1963). The certificate of in-

corporation may provide otherwise. See text accompanying note 12 supra. Compare
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 26A (1974).
36. "It is the duty of directors as fiduciary agents, irrespective of any rule giving
preemptive rights to shareholders, to exercise a power to issue additional shares, as well
as all their other powers, in good faith for the benefit of the shareholders who constitute the corporation." Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, 42 HARv. L.
Rxv. 186, 188 (1928).
37. See, e.g., Gieselmann v. Stegeman, 443 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1969); Johnson v.
Duensing, 351 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1961).
38. See, e.g., Hammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N.Y.S. 172 (2d Dep't
1933).
39. See, e.g., Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907).
40. It has been held that a shareholder is not required to exercise a pre-emptive
right merely to protect his economic interest from dilution (as the sale for an inadequate price) where no business purpose exists for the new issue of stock. Katzowitz v.
Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 301 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1969).
41. 239 App. Div. at 42, 265 N.Y.S. at 177.
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of pre-emptive rights. Traditionally, that concept has referred to the
right ratably to purchase a new issue of stock. Instead, the Hammer
classification includes within the scope of pre-emptive rights the opportunity ratably to purchase any issue of stock because the denial of
such opportunity will result in harm to the shareholder. 42 Whether
or not the opportunity to purchase treasury shares as equitable relief
may be termed an award of a "pre-emptive right" seems to be a matter of semantics. Such terminology does, however, confuse the issues
43
involved.
The finding of a breach of fiduciary duty in a sale of treasury
shares does not contradict the central proposition that, assuming directors act in furtherance of a corporate interest, a shareholder suffers no
injury merely by reinstatement to his former proportionate interest
when treasury stock is sold to another shareholder. However, the court
of appeals in the instant case determined, first, that the plaintiff was
entitled to maintain her increased proportionate interest in the corporation unless the change was not only to further a valid corporate
objective but absolutely necessary as well, and, second, that she was
injured by the relegation to her former status. This finding of injury
is in direct contradiction to traditional treasury stock theory.
The court of appeals apparently intends to limit to certain special
circumstances the right of a stockholder to maintain his increased proportionate ownership in outstanding stock when treasury stock is sold.
First, the court emphasized that the case involved a close corporation
wholly owned by the members of two families. Because the limited
numbers of shareholders are greatly concerned with proportionate
stock ownership and its relation to control, the sale of treasury stock
(or of new issues) creates special problems in the close corporation
context. 44 These problems are not likely to arise in a large corporation, where the sale of treasury stock ordinarily changes proportionate
ownership among the many shareholders by only a very small amount.
Second, the situation in the instant case involved the sale of treasury stock to those directors who were responsible for authorizing the
42. In his dissent from the fourth department's decision in Schwartz v. Marien,
Judge Moule agreed with the Hammer approach. He stated that the plaintiff "asks in
equity that a [pre-emptive] right be created for her." 43 App. Div. 2d at 313, 351
N.Y.S.2d at 223.
43. This vague distinction between a pre-emptive right and a director's fiduciary
obligation is discussed in 1 U. CHI. L. Rav. 645, 646 (1934).
44. 1 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07 (2d ed. 1971). For a discussion

of the problem of squeeze-outs in general, see F.H.
SHAREHOLDERS (1975).

O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
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sale. Although sale to a neutral third party would also reduce proportionate ownership, the issue of self-dealing would not arise. The
existence of self-interest among the directors is a prerequisite for a
finding of breach of fiduciary duty in a situation of this kind.

V.

CONCLUSION

The resale of treasury stock traditionally has been viewed as a
reinstatement of the shareholder to his original status. Since the shareholder was always subject to this reduction, no injury was thought to
flow from it. Thus, treasury shares have long been exempted from the
doctrine of pre-emptive rights. The New York Court of Appeals has
now rejected this position in favor of the rule that a shareholder is
entitled to mainain his proportionate status in a close corporation
when the directors sell treasury stock to themselves for purposes unrelated to the interests of the corporation, or to effectuate a valid corporate objective that could be accomplished without disturbing existing
proportionate ownership. Although contrary to former law, this approach reaches the proper result by recognizing that technical exceptions to the doctrine of pre-emptive rights cannot be used to disadvantage shareholders in situations in which equity courts would otherwise wish to protect them.
BARBARA G. EDMAN

